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The Article Nine security interest' is the Uniform Commer-
cial Code's 2  device for securing the repayment of a loan of
money or extension of credit.8 The purchase money security
interest 4 is a special type of security interest commonly used to
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1. Article 9 of the U.C.C. governs the creation, perfection, and enforcement of a
security interest in personal property. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) defines a security interest as:"an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an
obligation." Although the U.C.C. gives no official name to the device itself, it is generally
called "the Article Nine security interest." See J. WHiuE & R. SuMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNFORM COMMERCLl CODE 874 (2d ed. 1980).
2. The U.C.C. has been enacted in all states and the District of Columbia; however,
Louisiana has only adopted Articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 & 8. UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (Master
ed. 1980). All references in this article to the U.C.C. will be to the 1962 official text,
which Washington adopted in 1965. Uniform Commercial Code, 1965 Wash. Laws ex.
sess. ch. 157 (effective July 1, 1967) (current version at WASH. RaV. CODE tit. 62A (1978)).
The Washington State Bar's U.C.C. Revision Committee is currently studying the
1972 amendments and plans to introduce a bill to enact them in the next legislative
session.
For a discussion of the impact of the 1972 amendments on Washington law, see Bull,
Personal Property Security Interests in Washington-Adoption of the 1972 Official
Text of the Uniform Commercial Code Will Make a Good Law Better, 3 U. PUOT SD.
L. RE V. 1 (1979).
3. According to U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a), Article Nine applies "to any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal prop-
erty or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel
paper or contract rights."
The Official Note to U.C.C. § 9-102 provides that a repeal of all existing statutes
regulating security interests in personal property accompany the enactment of Article
Nine.
4. U.C.C. § 9-107 defines a purchase money security interest as one:
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such
value is in fact so used.
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finance the acquisition of consumer goods.' A consumer grants a
purchase money security interest either to the seller of the
goods,' or to a third party, such as a bank or credit union, that
loans money to the consumer who uses the money to purchase
the desired goods.7 If a consumer defaults8 under a security
agreement, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) gives the
secured party a variety of rights.' One of the remedies is to
repossess the collateral, and after disposing of the collateral, and
making appropriate application of the proceeds of the debt, to
The key difference between a purchase money security interest and other security
interests is that the extension of credit or loan is actually used to enable the debtor to
acquire rights in the collateral. Compare North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit
Ass'n, 189 Neb. 44, 200 N.W.2d 1 (1972) with Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States,
431 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1970) and In re Ultra Precision Indus., Inc., 503 F.2d 414 (9th
Cir. 1974).
A purchase money security interest plays a special role in financing. For this reason,
the Code affords special priority to a purchase money secured creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-
312(3)-(4). Special perfection rules also apply. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (automatic
perfection of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods).
5. U.C.C. § 9-109 states: "Goods are (1) 'consumer goods', if they are used or bought
for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." The Washington Supreme
Court discussed the meaning of consumer goods in Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v.
Carter, 83 Wash. 2d 136, 516 P.2d 767 (1973).
6. U.C.C. § 9-107(a).
7. U.C.C. § 9-107(b).
8. The Code does not define "default." Consequently, each security agreement must
provide the applicable definition. A typical default clause found in a security agreement
includes such items as: 1) default in any payment when due; 2) default in the perform-
ance of any obligation or covenant contained in the security agreement; 3) any warranty,
representation or statement made or furnished to the creditor by or on behalf of the
debtor which proves to have been false in any material respect when made or furnished;
4) loss, theft, damage, destruction, sale or encumbrance to or of any of the collateral; 5)
the making of any levy, seizure or attachment on the collateral; 6) death or insolvency of
the debtor; and 7) an adverse change in the financial condition of the debtor which in
the creditor's opinion impairs the creditor's security or increases its risk. See also R.
SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
LAw 115 (2d ed. 1974).
9. A secured party's rights when a debtor defaults are set forth in U.C.C. § 9-501(1)
which provides in part-
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has
the rights and remedies provided in this Part [Part 5 of Article Nine] and
except as limited by subsection (3) those provided in the security agreement.
He may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the secur-
ity interest by any available judicial procedure. . . . The rights and remedies
referred to in this subsection are cumulative.
The section of Part 5 which relates to a deficiency reads in part:
If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must
account to the debtor for any surplus, and, unless otherwise agreed, the debtor
is liable for any deficienc....
U.C.C. § 9-504(2).
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sue the debtor for the difference between the secured debt and
the proceeds of the disposition (the deficiency).10
This article focuses on a secured party's right to hold a
debtor liable for a deficiency when resale of the goods does not
satisfy the remaining obligation. Although the State of Washing-
ton adopted the U.C.C. with relatively few changes,' 1 it did
enact a different version of section 9-501 governing consumer
liability for deficiencies. Under the Washington statute a con-
sumer debtor is not liable for a deficiency in the event of default
under a purchase money security agreement when the secured
party is the seller of the collateral and uses self-help to repos-
sess.12 This article examines Washington's version of section 9-
501, and its treatment of deficiencies. This examination is par-
ticularly timely because recent litigation can result in a clear
interpretation by the Washington Supreme Court of the Wash-
ington version of U.C.C. Section 9-501.13 Whatever the result of
10. The creditor is also entitled to recover certain costs incurred in connection with
the repossession and resale. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a)-(c). See generally Hogan, The Secured
Party and Default Proceedings Under the UCC, 47 MINN. L. RaV. 205 (1963).
11. For a discussion of the Washington enactment of the U.C.C. and how its version
differs from the official 1962 text, see WASHINGTON RsvmW STAFF, COLLECTED ESSAYS ON
THE UNWORM COMMECIAL CODE IN WASHINGTON (1967); Cosway & Shattuck, The Uni-
form Commercial Code - S.B. 122, 40 WASH. L. REV. 873 (1965).
12. The Washington version of U.C.C. § 9-501 adds the following subparagraph to
U.C.C. § 9-501(1):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, in the case of a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods taken or retained by the seller of
such collateral to secure all or part of its price, the debtor shall not be liable
for any deficiency after the secured party has disposed of such collateral under
RCW 62A.9-504 or has retained such collateral in satisfaction of the debt
under subsection (2) of RCW 62A.9-505.
WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-501(1) (1966).
Sections 9-504 and 9-505 refer to the creditor's option of either conducting a sale of
the collateral to satisfy the debt (§ 9-504) or retaining the collateral and declaring the
debts satisfied (§ 9-505). The Washington versions of those sections are identical to the
uniform text.
13. On September 22, 1980, the Washington Supreme Court heard oral argument in
the case of Tacoma Telco Fed. Credit Union v. Edwards, No. 46887-7, (Wash. Sup. Ct.,
certification accepted March 17, 1979). The case was certified to the supreme court as a
case of first impression, on appeal from Telco's suit against Edwards. Telco sued
Edwards for the sum of $1,306.73, which represented the difference between a purchase
money loan it had made to Edwards and the proceeds of Telco's sale after the debtor
had returned the collateral to the credit union. On cross-motions for summary judgment,
Edwards argued that WASH. Rzv. CODE § 62A.9-501(1) (1979) barred Telco from collect-
ing a deficiency from Edwards. The credit union defended on the grounds that the prohi-
bition of WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-501(1) (1979) did not apply to a credit union because
it was not a seller. The trial court granted summary judgment to Telco on its claim for a
deficiency. On appeal, both parties identified the issue as being whether WASH. REV.
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the litigation, however, the Washington legislature must still
address the question of consumer liability for deficiencies. To
understand the effect of the present Washington statute, this
article first reviews the history of a consumer debtor's liability
for a deficiency arising out of a secured debt. It next analyzes
the rules regarding deficiencies introduced by section 9-501,
compares these rules to the Washington version of that section,
and examines the background of Washington's unique version of
CODE § 62A.9-501(1) (1979) prevents a secured party, that is not a seller, from obtaining
a deficiency from a debtor under a purchase money security interest in consumer goods
when the secured party has disposed of the collateral under WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-
504 (1979).
The court should rule that the proper interpretation of WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-
501(1) (1979) is that only seller/secured parties are barred from recovering deficiencies.
See text accompanying notes 53-54 infra. However, regardless of the decision of the
court in Telco, or any other case, the Washington legislature must address the question
of consumer liability for deficiencies.
Other pending lawsuits raise the issue of proper construction of WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.9-501 (1979). Northwestern Collection v. Miller, No. 79-2-02205-3 (Snohomish
County Super. Ct., filed June 26, 1979), is an appeal from a decision of the South District
Justice Court of Snohomish County which stated that WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-501(1)
(1979) applies "equally to the seller of collateral and to a bank which has loaned funds to
purchase the collateral provided that they are both secured parties." On Oct. 27, 1980,
the court held that the bank is entitled to a deficiency judgment because it was not the
seller of the car.
Yet another case, Bank of Everett v. Logan, No. 79-2-03987-8 (Snohomish County
Super. Ct., filed Nov. 13, 1979), has been stayed pending the decision of the Washington
Supreme Court in Telco. The author has not conducted a survey of state courts to deter-
mine how many other lawsuits may be pending dealing with the construction of WASH.
REV. CODE § 62A.9-501(1) (1979). The supreme court decision in Telco will control the
outcome in those cases. The number of lawsuits on file does not reveal the scope of the
deficiency problem because cases which might raise the issue are usually settled. Attor-
neys counsel clients to avoid raising the issue due to the uncertain state of the law.
One possible reason for the uncertainty over the application of WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.9-501 (1979) to non-sellers is that the first version of the Washington Practice Man-
ual contained a statement to the effect that the statute applies to all purchase money
secured parties. See 8 W. SHATrUCK & R. COSWAY, WASH. PRACTICE, Comment 9:1270(5)
(1967). The most recent supplement to that volume corrects this error. Id. at Supp. 1980.
Unfortunately, Division 1 of the Washington Court of Appeals favorably quoted the 1967
language in dicta in Lew v. Goodfellow Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 226, 231,
492 P.2d 258, 262 (1971). A further example of how repetition compounds an error is
that the FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE PRESIDING OFFICER ON PROPOSED
TRADE REGULATION RULE: CREDIT PRACTICES 16 CFR PART 444: PUBLIC RECORD 215-42
(1980) [hereinafter cited as CREDIT PRACTICES] lists Washington as a state that bars defi-
ciencies, id. at 242, based on a statement by a Washington Legal Services attorney who,
in all likelihood, relied on the Washington Practice volume and the Lew case. See id. at
241, n.193. The FTC corrected this error in FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BUREAU OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION, CREDIT PRACnCES, STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE 16 CFR PART 444: PUBLIC RECORD 215-42, 256 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as FTC STAFF REPORT].
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section 9-501. Finally, consumer protection problems in the area
of deficiencies are explored, and possible methods of addressing
those concerns are discussed.
II. PRE-CODE CONSUMER DEBTOR LIAmLITY FOR DEFICIENCIES
Prior to the adoption of the U.C.C." contracting parties
used a number of different legal devices, each with its own form
and set of rules, to secure the repayment of debts incurred in
connection with the acquisition of goods.' The two devices most
commonly used in consumer transactions were the conditional
sales contract and the chattel mortgage. 16 When a buyer pur-
chased goods under a conditional sales contract, title passed to
the buyer conditioned on his complete payment.17 If the buyer
failed to complete payment, the contract was breached and the
seller then had two options. The first option, which could be
done without judicial intervention, was an election to treat the
contract as in default and recover the goods.' s In that case, the
contract was terminated when the seller repossessed the goods,
and the seller had no surviving contractual rights against the
buyer. Thus, the defaulting buyer under a conditional sales con-
tract was not liable to the seller for any deficiency. The second
option was election to treat the sale as a sale on general credit,
and to sue the buyer for any portion of the unpaid purchase
price. Under this theory the seller theoretically passed title to
the goods to the buyer, and forfeited any rights to repossess the
goods. Courts considered these options mutually inconsistent;
election of one remedy prevented later resort to the other.1'
14. For a detailed discussion of pre-Code security law, see 1 G. GILMOIE, SEcurrY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 1.1-8.8 (1965).
15. These devices included, among others, conditional sales contracts, chattel mort-
gages, factor's liens, field warehousing, and trust receipts. For a detailed discussion of
these various devices, see id.
16. See generally L. JoNEs, THE LAW OF CHAT EL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL
SALES (6th ed. rev. & enlarged R. Bowers 1933); 1 G. GEIMORE, supra note 14, at §§ 2.1-
3.8.
17. See generally R.S. HoAR, CONDITIONAL SALES (1929); A. SQULLANTE & V. FON-
SUA, WILLISTON ON SALES (4th ed. 1973); L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF SALES 280-
81 (2d ed. 1959).
18. See L. VOLD, supra note 17, at 292-98. See also note 17 supra.
19. Compare the election of remedies provision of the Uniform Conditional Sales
Act.
After the retaking of possession as provided in § 16 the buyer shall be liable for
the price only after a resale and only to the extent provided in § 22. Neither
the bringing of an action by the seller for the recovery of the whole or any part
10319801
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Unlike the conditional seller, the chattel mortgagee did not have
to elect remedies.2 0 If the-debtor defaulted, the chattel mortga-
gee had both a right to the property and a right to hold the
debtor liable for any deficiency remaining on the purchase price.
However, the chattel mortgagee could retake the mortgaged
property only through judicial process. Thus a major difference
between conditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages was
the remedies available under each respective device. Conse-
quently, under pre-Code law whether or not a consumer debtor
would be liable for a deficiency depended on the form of security
device used.21 The previous discussion of general pre-Code law
reviews the basic state of the law in Washington prior to that
of the price, nor the recovery of judgment in such action nor the collection of a
portion of the price, shall be deemed inconsistent with a later retaking of the
goods as provided in § 16. But such right of retaking shall not be exercised by
the seller after he has collected the entire price, or after he has claimed a lien
upon the goods, or attracted them, or levied upon them as the goods of the
buyer.
Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 24: Election of Remedies, reprinted in National Con-
ference of Commissioners, Uniform Acts Approved and Recommended (1951 ed.)
20. In the United States, statutes exclusively created and governed the chattel mort-
gage. Although some state laws allowed the use of a chattel mortgage in a purchase
money transaction, its use was frequently restricted to situations where the debtor
already held title to the goods. See 1 G. Gn.Monz, supra note 14, at § 2.2; 2 GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERECS § 498 (rev. ed. 1940).
21. The form of security device used sometimes depended on whether the source of
funds was a seller or non-seller. In some states, such as Washington, judicial decisions
restricted the conditional sale device to the use of the actual seller in the economic sense.
Neither the financer nor lender of money could use the device. In Hughbanks, Inc. v.
Gourley, 12 Wash. 2d 44, 120 P.2d 523 (1941), the court stated:
This court has held that it is not the office of a conditional bill of sale to
secure a loan of money. Its purpose, rather, is only to permit an owner of per-
sonal property to make a bona fide sale on credit, reserving title in himself, for
security, until the purchase price is fully paid. This particular security device,
with its severe remedial incidents, is not favored in the law and its use has
been restricted to situations where persons standing in the actual relation of
vendor and vendee have desired to effect a credit sale. It is in such cases that it
finds its only legitimate use.
Where, on the other hand, one who is the owner of a particular chattel
wishes to borrow money and is willing to let the chattel stand as security for
his debt, a chattel mortgage is the appropriate means for affording such pro-
tection to the creditor. And this is as true where the property mortgaged is
purchased with the borrowed funds as where it has long been in the borrower's
possession.
Id. at 49, 120 P.2d at 525.
In fact, due to the dual benefits of avoiding usury laws and rights to self-help repos-
session, many non-sellers apparently preferred the conditional sales device. See Gilmore,
The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
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state's enactment of the U.C.C. 2  The Washington Supreme
Court had explicitly recognized the doctrine of election of reme-
dies with regard to conditional sales contracts. s At the same
time Washington statutes provided two alternate methods for
foreclosing on a chattel mortgage: one, a foreclosure proceeding
which was fairly lengthy; the other, a more summary proceeding,
where chattel mortgagee action could result in a sheriff sale of
the property by informal notice and sale proceedings. 4 The
mortgagee was not required to elect remedies, under either
method, and could hold a debtor liable for any resulting defi-
ciency. The chattel mortgagee could use neither self-help nor a
power of sale clause to obtain possession of the property to avoid
the burden of foreclosing." Even the summary method of notice
and sale involved the use of a court officer to obtain possession
of the property and to conduct the sale. Therefore, in Washing-
22. For a general discussion of the law of conditional sales and chattel mortgages in
Washington, see Starr, Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages, 9 WASH. L. REv. 143
(1934). For illustrative cases distinguishing conditional sales contracts from chattel mort-
gages in Washington, see Pacific Metal Co. v. Joslin, 359 F.2d 396 (9th Cir. 1966); Smith
v. Downs, 48 Wash. 2d 165, 292 P.2d 205 (1956); Lahn & Simmons v. Matzen Woolen
Mills, 147 Wash. 560, 266 P.2d 697 (1928).
23. Eilers Music House v. Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, 685, 156 P. 937, 938 (1916); see
Standard Fin. Co. v. Townsend, 1 Wash. 2d 274, 276, 95 P.2d 786, 787 (1939). See also
Washington Coop. Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wash. 2d 460, 463, 256 P.2d 294, 296 (1953).
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12.160 (1979) (repealed Uniform Commercial Code, ch.
157, § 10-102(1)(a)(vii), 1965 Wash. Laws ex. seas.), provided that if a chattel mortgage
contained an express agreement for the payment of the sum of money secured, the mort-
gagee who proceeded to foreclose could recover a deficiency from the debtor. WASH. REv.
CODE § 61.08.010 (1979) (repealed Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 157, § 10-
102(1)(a)(xiii), 1965 Wash. Laws ex. ses.), provided a method whereby the chattel mort-
gagee could cause the sheriff to sell the property through informal notice and sale pro-
ceedings without court action, Under this procedure as well, the mortgagee could recover
any resulting deficiency.
25. In an article comparing Article 9 and pre-Code Washington law, Professor Shat-
tuck states:
In Roche Fruit & Produce Co. v. Vaught, 143 Wash. 601, 255 P. 953 (1927), the
court declined to enforce a mortgage clause conferring on the mortgagee a right
to possession on default. This case was followed in Carey v. Interstate Bond &
Mortgage Co., 4 Wash. 2d 632, 164 P.2d 579 (1940), in holding a mortgagee
who took possession by self-help to be a converter despite such a mortgage
clause. Another step in a chain of events which precluded use of the power of
sale form of chattel mortgage realization in Washington was taken in Parks v.
Yakima Valley Prod. Credit Assoc., 194 Wash. 380, 78 P.2d 162 (1938). There,
a mortgagee in possession was held in conversion for selling the goods, despite
a power of sale clause.
Shattuck, Secured Transactions (other than Real Estate Mortgage) - A Comparison of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and The Pre-Code Washington Laws,
reprinted in THE UNIFORM COMMECIAL CODE IN WASHINGTON 638, 764 n.232 (1967).
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ton, a consumer debtor under either a conditional sale contract
or a chattel mortgage had some degree of protection from a defi-
ciency. In the case of a conditional sale, the debtor could either
lose the property or retain the property and be liable for the
contract price. Under a chattel mortgage, although the debtor
would both lose the property and be liable for a deficiency, the
involvement of a court officer in the repossession and resale
activities provided some assurance of fairness in the computa-
tion of the deficiency. 6
III. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE'S TREATMENT OF
DEFICIENCIES
A. In General
The Uniform Commercial Code's drafters carefully consid-
ered the extent to which pre-Code law should be retained or dis-
carded. In drafting Article Nine, they examined and analyzed
the wide variety of pre-Code security devices. Their analysis
revealed that these legal devices shared many common charac-
teristics.' One important common characteristic was that each
device was designed to give special rights in identifiable personal
property to secure the repayment of a loan of money or exten-
sion of credit.' 8 The drafters' analysis indicated that the differ-
ing forms and rules governing the creation of the various secur-
ity devices confused creditors and that their complexity created
problems that required a degree of sophistication that most
creditors did not have."e The drafters found no justification for
the differences between the security devices. Consequently, the
26. Cf. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Peterson, 7 Wash. App. 196, 199-200 n.2, 498
P.2d 884, 886 n.2 (1972), wherein the court states: "If anything, the debtor generally has
more protection through a judicial foreclosure under direct supervision of the court than
under the self-help provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code."
27. 1 G. GU.MORE, supra note 14, at § 9.1; 2 G. GLMoRE, SEcurrv INTERESTs iN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.1 (1965).
28. The official text to U.C.C. § 9-102 states that the "main purpose of this Section
is to bring all consensual security interests in personal property and fixtures under this
Article."
29. For example, Grant Gilmore observed:
All of this - past, present, and future - is appalling. The direct cost -
the time and expense involved in drafting the statutes and lobbying them
through legislatures - is bad enough. But what is really serious is the progres-
sive confusion which results from the yearly addition of still another eccentric
piece of security legislation.
Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 L. & CoNTrUa.
PROB. 27, 32 (1951).
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drafters explicitly abolished distinctions based on different types
of transactions.3 0 They rejected the pre-Code system and, in its
place, adopted a single approach emphasizing the similarities of
the different devices.3' They created a new, simpler, and more
efficient device, known simply as an "Article Nine security inter-
est." Concomitantly, a single scheme of creditors' remedies
replaced the previous system of remedies where the form of
device used had dictated the available remedy."
The U.C.C. Article Nine security interest completely
changed pre-Code law regarding conditional sales contracts and
chattel mortgages. First, these two different security devices
were abolished.33 Although parties may still use pre-Code forms,
the Code emphasizes substance over form, and both devices are
treated as security agreements.' Second, the Code abolished the
distinction in remedies available under those different devices.5
Specifically, the U.C.C. sets forth a wide range of remedies avail-
able to a secured party upon a debtor's default, and provides
that those remedies are cumulative.3 6 Among the available reme-
dies is the right to use self-help to repossess, to resell the goods,
and if the proceeds of the sale do not satisfy the remaining obli-
gation, to hold the debtor liable for the deficiency.3 7 In marked
30. The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 states:
The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within
which the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can
go forward with less cost and with greater certainty.
Under this Article the traditional distinctions among security devices,
based largely on form, are not retained; the Article applies to all transactions
intended to create security interests in personal property and fixtures, and the
single term "security interest" substitutes for the variety of descriptive terms
which had grown up at common law and under a hundred-year accretion of
statutes.
31. The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 9-101 provides: "Under the Article distinc-
tions based on form. . . are no longer controlling .... The scheme of the Article is to
make distinctions, where distinctions are necessary, along functional rather than formal
lines."
32. For a brief summary of the Article 9 scheme of creditors' rights and an explana-
tion of its relationship to pre-Code law, see U.C.C. § 9-504 and accompanying comments.
See, e.g., 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 14, at § 9.1.
33. See note 30 supra.
34. The Official Comment to U.C.C. § 9-102 states: "The article does not in terms
abolish existing security devices. The conditional sale or bailment lease, for example, is
not prohibited; but even though it is used, the rules of this Article govern."
35. U.C.C. § 9-202 provides: "Each provision of this article with regard to rights,
obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in
the debtor."
36. U.C.C. § 9-501(1) (last sentence).
37. See text accompanying note 9 supro.
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contrast to pre-Code law, a creditor in the position of a chattel
mortgagee may proceed through self-help directly against the
collateral. Also in contrast to pre-Code law, after retaking the
goods, a creditor in the position of a conditional seller may
recover a deficiency.
B. In Washington
When the Washington legislature enacted section 9-501, it
departed from the uniform text's treatment of creditors' reme-
dies by adding a subparagraph to section 9-501(1) which
provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code, in the case
of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods taken
or retained by the seller of such collateral to secure all or part
of its price, the debtor shall not be liable for any deficiency
after the secured party has disposed of such collateral under
R.C.W. 62A.9-504 or has retained such collateral in satisfaction
of the debt under subsection (2) of R.C.W. 62A.9-505."
The subparagraph distinguishes between sellers who retain
a purchase money security interest at the time of sale (seller/
secured party) and any other lender who, by making a direct
loan to a consumer, finances the purchase of goods (non-seller/
secured party). Seller/secured parties who use self-help to repos-
sess collateral are barred from recovering a deficiency from a
consumer debtor. Non-seller/secured parties, who use self-help
to repossess collateral, are free to recover a deficiency. As a
result, two consumers who purchase identical goods from the
same seller, but use different financing methods, are treated dif-
ferently. The consumer who finances through the seller is pro-
tected from a deficiency, but the consumer who obtains a direct
loan from a third party is not.
It is noteworthy that Washington, which enacted most of
the official version of the U.C.C. without change, departed from
the official version's treatment of creditors' remedies and
enacted its unique version of section 9-501(1). The statute does
not explain why a distinction is drawn between seller/secured
parties and non-seller/secured parties. It is therefore necessary
to explore the legislative history to determine whether there is a
logical rationale or justification for the distinction.
38. WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-501(1) (1979).
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The legislative history of Washington's section 9-501 sug-
gests that the legislators had two different and arguably incom-
patible purposes when they enacted Washington Revised Code §
62A.9-501(1). First, there was a desire to protect consumer debt-
ors from deficiencies in purchase money secured transactions.
Second, there was a desire to preserve the pre-Code rights of
non-seller/secured parties to recover deficiencies. When legisla-
tors tried to raise the consumer protection issues during debate
on S.B. 122, the bill that became the U.C.C., they were informed
that the matter had been disposed of during consideration of an
earlier draft of the bill." It is therefore necessary to examine the
earlier draft to construct the legislative history for S.B. 122.40
The original Washington bill contained an amendment to
uniform section 9-501 which, according to its sponsors, would
preserve the pre-Code treatment of deficiencies. That amend-
ment provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this act the debtor
shall not be liable for any deficiency in the case of a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods after the secured
party has disposed of the collateral under Section 9-504 or has
retained the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation under
subsection (2) of 9-505.41
During debate on the H.B. 129, specific discussions consid-
39. Although commentators have suggested there is no legislative history for WASH.
Rv. CODE § 62A.9-501 (1979), see Bull, supra note 2, the legislative history may be
found by tracing the legislation back through earlier drafts. The question of a consumer
debtor's liability for a deficiency arose when the legislature considered S.B. 122, the bill
which was ultimately adopted as the U.C.C. The legislative history shows that this ques-
tion was specifically addressed:
Senator Stender: I'd like to ask Senator Petrich a question. I guess we're all
questioning him as the sponsor of the bill ... In this bill, I was advised there
was a provision, under a conditional sales contract, that if the purchaser was
not able to fulfill his contract and the automobile was repossessed and sold at
whatever price they agreed upon, they would then garnishee [sic] the man's
wages for the deficiency, is that correct?
Senator Petrich: Senator Stender, two years ago that matter was taken care of
and is incorporated in this particular bill by House amendment which elimi-
nated deficiency judgments under private sale.
WASH. SENATE J., 39th Leg. 305-06 (1965) (emphasis added).
40. Further research into the previous draft of the bill, and the amendment to which
Senator Petrich was referring, see note 39 supra, reveals that in fact the amendment did
not, as Senator Petrich suggested, eliminate deficiency judgments under private sale in
all situations - rather the distinction between sellers and other lenders was drawn. See
note 42 infra.
41. WASH. Housz J., 38th Leg. 576-77 (1963) (emphasis added).
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ered the impact of that amendment on a consumer's liability for
a deficiency.,2 Sponsors of the amendment argued that it pre-
served' pre-Code law, which barred conditional sellers from
recovering a deficiency but allowed chattel mortgagees to do so.
A review of the debate demonstrates that the proponents of the
amendment to section 9-501 were concerned with protecting
consumers from deficiencies in conditional sales situations. At
the same time, opponents of the proposed amendment argued
that the amendment changed pre-Code law, because the term"secured parties" under the Code, is broader than conditional
sellers.43 The opponents wished to limit the prohibition against
deficiencies to persons in the position of conditional sellers, thus
preserving the pre-Code rights of persons in the position of chat-
42. Mr. Litchman: Mr. Ackley, on page 223, the committee provided an amend-
ment, I believe at your insistence. Would one be deprived of a deficiency if one
defaults on a chattel mortgage?
Mr. Ackley: Mr. Litchman, it is my understanding the amendment was offered
to prevent the seller from repossessing an automobile or other goods sold on
terms similar to your conditional sales contract now, and then getting a defi-
ciency judgment in addition. It is not my understanding that this would apply
to anything other than the case of purchase money securities. If you go down
and get a chattel mortgage, it is not my understanding that it would be any
different than it is now. I think you could get a deficiency judgment on that
sort of chattel mortgage but not on conditional sales contracts.
Mr. Litchman: Would it be correct to say your amendment denies deficiencies
only on the conditional sales contracts?
Mr. Ackley: That is my understanding.
Mr. Litchman: Mr. Andersen, is that your statement too, for the record?
It is quite important.
Mr. Andersen: My understanding, I believe, is the same as Mr. Ackley's. The
purpose of the amendment was to delete the deficiency judgment in purchase
money transactions where such a thing could be abused in the opinion of the
committee and where it was not desirable at this time without a lot of addi-
tional study to permit deficiency judgments.
Mr. Litchman: You are not trying to deny a deficiency judgment against one
who has a chattel mortgage?
Mr. Andersen: I believe I have answered that as fully as I can.
Mr. Litchman: I think Mr. Ackley answered my question, but I wonder if
others concur in it. Do you, Mr. Gorton?
Mr. Gorton: Yes, Mr. Litchman, I do.
WASH. HOUSE J., 38th Leg. 682-83 (1963).
43. The legislative debate suggests that perhaps the legislators were not sufficiently
familiar with the U.C.C.'s new terminology. Note, for example, Mr. Ackley's statement
that since, in his understanding, the legislation applied only to "purchase money securi-
ties", it would not apply to a chattel mortgage. Id. This apparent lack of familiarity is
unfortunate because, if they had been aware of the scope of the initial amendment, they
might have engaged in a more detailed debate of the consumer protection issues.
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tel mortgagees.
Prior to the next legislative session, legislators and a num-
ber of interested parties corresponded with one another regard-
ing the proposed version of section 9-501. Their correspondence
reveals that the present statute was proposed in recognition of
the opposition to a total ban on deficiencies and of the desire to
preserve the pre-Code status quo. 4 The language limiting its
scope to sellers preserved the pre-Code distinction between the
rights of conditional sellers and chattel mortgagees to recover
deficiencies. This compromise between the two conflicting pur-
poses was apparently brought about through private correspon-
dence and some floor debate. There was no evidence of the avail-
ability of empirical data to demonstrate either an economic basis
or social policy to support the distinction between seller/secured
parties and non-seller/secured parties.
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE WASHINGTON STATUTE
As a result of this legislative compromise Washington con-
sumers receive less protection from deficiencies under Washing-
ton Revised Code § 62A.9-501 than they did under pre-Code
law. Although the Washington statute prohibits a seller/secured
party from obtaining a deficiency judgment when he uses self-
help to repossess, thus giving a modicum of protection to con-
sumers, it is not an improvement on prior Washington law.
Lenders who are secured parties are no longer obliged to fore-
close with judicial intervention but may now use self-help to
repossess collateral and still recover a deficiency. Creditors'
unsupervised repossession of goods has led to some of the most
flagrant abuses when a creditor seeks a deficiency judgment.4 5
The Washington statute does little to curb these abuses, thus
affording consumers less protection than pre-Code law.
Additionally, the Washington statute causes consumer hard-
ship because it creates a need for certain creditor disclosures,
which the Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA)4" does not
44. Letters are on file in Law Review office.
45. See CREDIT PRACTICES, supra note 13, at 205-23; 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 27, at
§ 44-1; THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 28 (1972) thereinafter NCCF CONSUMER CREDIT]; Krahmer, Creditors,
Consumers and Article 9 of the U.C.C., 5 TOL. L. REv. 1, 33-37 (1973).
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1665 (1976). See generally Boyd, The Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act - A Consumer Perspective, 45 NOTRE DAME LAw. 171 (1970).
Any comprehensive analysis of problems under the TILA must also make reference to
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require. Consumers have come to rely on the TILA full disclo-
sure requirements, which inform consumers of the terms of
credit, including the amount of down payment, interest rate, and
total amount paid. 7 However, the TILA does not require disclo-
sure of a creditor's rights in the event of a debtor's default.4 8
Therefore, the absence of information regarding a consumer's
liability for a deficiency under the Washington statute could
potentially mislead consumers to select financing from a non--
seller/secured lender, thus resulting in exposure to a possible
deficiency judgment in the event of default.49
The goal of the TILA is to encourage and improve the abil-
ity of consumers to shop for credit"0 and make informed credit
decisions. Given this purpose, creditors should make all relevant
credit information available so that consumers may make a
knowledgeable selection. Unless state law requires disclosure51
concerning creditor rights upon default, consumers will likely
select a loan from a lender rather than a seller, because generally
regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to its authority under
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). These regulations are cumulatively referred to as Regulation Z.
12 C.F.R. 226.1-.15 (1980).
47. The Truth in Lending disclosure requirements are contained in Part B of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1645 (1976). Required information includes: cash price of prop-
erty or services purchased, id. § 1638(a)(1); down payment or trade-in value, id. §
1638(a)(2); finance charges, id. § 1638(a)(7); and description of any security interest the
creditor retained, id. § 1638(a)(10).
48. Cf. FRB Official Staff Interpretation No. FC-0117 [1974-77 Transfer Binder]
CONS. CREDrr GUIDE (CCH) t 81,703 (1977) (consumers do not have to be told that they
are not subject to a deficiency judgment if the creditor repossesses the collateral at a
time when the loan balance is under $1,250).
49. A recent critical analysis of the TILA suggests that the disclosure requirements
leave out more important information than they include. Landers & Rohner, A Func-
tional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REv. 711 (1979). The article questions
TILA's basic premise that disclosures will influence consumer behavior.
50. The general purpose clause of the TILA, provides:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged
in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use
of credit. The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost
thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaning-
ful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the unin-
formed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and
unfair credit billing and credit practices.
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976).
51. The Act does not "annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any creditor from complying
with, the laws of any State relating to the disclosure of information in connection with
credit transactions." Id. § 1610(a). The Washington Consumer Protection Act, WASH.
REv. CODE § 19.86.020 (1979), does not contain such disclosure requirements.
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the lender will charge a lower rate of interest.52 However, due to
the Washington version of section 9-501, that choice could be
detrimental to the consumer, because in the event of default, the
consumer will be liable for a deficiency. Had the consumer
granted a security interest to the seller instead of the lender, the
consumer would not be liable for a deficiency. Because the TILA
does not require such a disclosure, Washington's section 9-501,
although attempting to protect some consumers from deficien-
cies, may cause a consumer to unwisely choose financing which
would not have been selected upon full disclosure.
Not only does the Washington statute fail to provide ade-
quate consumer protection, but also it creates two arbitrary clas-
ses of lenders: sellers and non-sellers. Consequently, two arbi-
trary classes of consumers are established: consumers who
finance their purchases through sellers, and consumers who
finance their purchasers through non-sellers. The only difference
between these consumers is their source of credit.5 3 Thus,
whether a consumer is protected from a deficiency depends on
the fortuity of the consumer's method of financing."
52. For an empirical study which shows that consumers who finance cars with a
dealer could borrow more cheaply at a commercial bank, see White & Munger, Consumer
Sensitivity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans,
69 MIcH. L. REV. 1207 (1971).
53. Stefen Riesenfeld criticized a similar distinction in a former California real
property anti-deficiency statute:
Are there, then, any rational grounds for a differentiation between vendor and
third party financing of acquisitions? ... Hence, unless it all boils down to the
case that lending institutions are able to marshal a lobby while vendors as a
class are not, some other ground must be found to justify such discrimination.
The main factor which rationally could be relied upon for that purpose is the
proposition that vendors have the last word on the price for which they are
willing to part with the property, and, therefore, should be burdened with a
risk from which mere financers remain free. It is, however, painful to deter-
mine whether this difference in influence on the terms of the bargain justifies
so drastic a discrimination in the resulting rights.
Riesenfeld, California Legislature Curbing Deficiency Judgments, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 705,
727-28 (1960) (footnotes omitted). The California statute was subsequently amended to
delete the distinction between seller and non-seller lenders.
54. There are at least two possible rationales which may be advanced to explain the
distinction between sellers and non-sellers, however, both are readily rebutted. First it is
said that a seller is in a better position to protect itself from the risk of loss because it is
able to adjust the down payments and establish the price of the goods. Second, it is
asserted that the seller is in a superior economic position in relation to the buyer which
could be oppressive if the seller were permitted to assume too many remedies. Because
the seller's economic position is superior to the buyer's, and the seller basically sets the
terms of the bargain, the seller should not be permitted the additional advantage of a
deficiency. Note, however, that lenders stand in a similarly superior economic position in
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The Washington statute also ignores two important U.C.C.
policies: uniformity of commercial law among the states,55 and
treating similar transactions in the same fashion. 6 The policy of
uniformity demands that all states enact identical statutes gov-
erning commercial transactions. The U.C.C. is the model for the
states to enact. Washington's failure to enact the uniform ver-
sion of section 9-501 defeats that policy and the goal of predict-
ability underlying it. Likewise, Washington ignores the second
policy by distinguishing between the treatment of seller/secured
parties and non-seller/secured parties. Despite the fact that
these parties serve the same function, the Washington version of
section 9-501 treats them differently. Under the uniform version,
both are purchase money secured creditors. As purchase money
secured creditors, both perform the same function of financing
the purchase of personal property in exchange for a security
interest in the goods. The U.C.C. treats both types of secured
creditors and the resulting purchase money secured transactions
identically. Washington ignores the similarities in substance and
emphasizes the technical distinction in form, thus thwarting the
Code's preference for substance over form. Another flaw in the
Washington statute is the basic distinction it draws between
purchase money and non-purchase money transactions. No
empirical data suggests that consumers need more protection
from deficiencies arising from purchase money transactions than
from non-purchase money transactions. The Washington statute
affords absolutely no protection to a consumer in a non-purchase
money transaction. No studies of creditor abuse of deficiencies
identify purchase money transactions as the sole instance of
creditor abuse in the deficiency area.
Yet another problem with the Washington statute is that
the liability of a consumer for a deficiency where the seller
relation to borrowers, with the same susceptibility to oppression. The same statements
can be made about lenders who must be aware of the purpose of the loan and the value
of the collateral before advancing any funds. Therefore, the lender has the ability to
protect itself from the risk of loss by adjusting the amount of the loan to correspond to
the value of the property purchased with the loan. Cf. Clark, Default, Repossession,
Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A Journey to the Underworld And a Proposed Salvation,
51 OR. L. Rav. 302, 332 (1972) (because the U.C.C. does not limit a lender's collateral, a
consumer needs greater protection from overzealous lenders and sellers of services than
from sellers of goods).
55. U.C.C. § 1-102. For a discussion of the importance of enacting a uniform com-
mercial code, see Cosway & Shattuck, supra note 11, at 879-80.
56. U.C.C. § 1-102.
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assigns the consumer's security agreement is unclear. Because
the Washington statute's use of the word "seller" arguably
excludes an assignee of the seller, the statute is unclear whether
a consumer is liable for a deficiency to an assignee of the seller.
The statute clearly bars a seller/secured party from recovering a
deficiency from a consumer; however, it apparently allows a non-
seller/secured party to recover a deficiency. An assignee is tech-
nically not a seller;57 thus, it can be argued that a consumer will
be liable for a deficiency to the seller's assignee. 8 Despite this
technical argument, the statute should be interpreted to extend
the prohibition against deficiencies to sellers' assignees because
an assignee under common law has the same rights and obliga-
tions as its assignor.5  Furthermore, courts should read the stat-
utory prohibition to include sellers' assignees or else the purpose
of the statute can be completely thwarted. A seller would only
have to assign a contract whenever a default arose in order to
permit recovery of a deficiency.60
57. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d) defines a seller as "a person who sells or contracts to sell
goods." U.C.C. § 2-106(1) defines sales as "consist[ing] in the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price."
58. It could be argued that the language of WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-501 (1979)
prohibits only "sellers" from recovering deficiencies, and the assignee, typically a finance
company or bank, is not a seller under the Code definition.
Professor Thomas D. Crandall notes that the applicability of WASH. REV. CODE §
62A.9-501(1) (1966) to assignee-lenders has never been questioned because of the "(unre-
corded) legislative history of the provision." Crandall, It is Time for a Comprehensive
Federal Consumer Credit Code, 58 N.C.L. Rav. 1, 11 n.59 (1979).
59. 4 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 905 (1951 & Supp. 1971); 3 S. WILLIsTON, CONTRACTS
§ 432 (1920 & Supp. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 168 (Tent. Drafts
Nos. 1-7) (1973).
60. The federal holder-in-due-course-rule also supports the argument that an
assignee cannot recover a deficiency from a consumer under WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-
501(1) (1979). Under that rule, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice for a seller,
directly or indirectly, to take a consumer contract which lacks a notice stating that any
holder of the contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor could assert
against its seller. In addition, the same notice is required in a consumer credit contract
made in connection with certain purchase money loans. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1980). It
should be noted, however, that presently there are some interpretative difficulties with
the rule. The idea seems to be that the presence of such a notice in each consumer credit
contract gives notice to assignees of potential claims and defenses and, thus, precludes
holder-in-due course status. Nothing in the rule, however, seems to prohibit the assignee
from being a holder in due course if the notice is not present. The case law "close-con-
nectedness doctrine" can similarly result in subjecting an assignee to all claims and
defenses that a consumer could assert against the original seller. See, e.g., Unico v. Owen,
50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
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V. METHODS FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM
One of the purposes behind Washington's enactment of
Washington Revised Code § 62A.9-501(1) was to protect con-
sumers from deficiencies. The Washington statute may be
viewed as part of a national consumer protection movement
which has already resulted in the restriction or abolition of a
variety of abusive credit practices." A careful review of the liter-
ature advocating consumer protection through abolition of defi-
ciencies suggests that the problem being addressed is one of
basic unfairness to the consumer resulting from the methods
repossessing creditors use."' Specifically, empirical studies have
documented the fact that many creditors resell repossessed
goods twice. s The first time may be at below retail and whole-
sale prices and subsequently they may obtain a deficiency judg-
ment against a debtor. The second time the creditors may resell
the goods at a price that closely approximates the retail value of
61. For a recent discussion of the consumer protection movement in general, see
Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L.J. 461 (1973).
62. See D. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE 161-67 (1967); 2 G. GILMORE, supra note
27, at 1212-13; Clark, supra note 54, at 310; Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response
to Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 409 (1967); Kripke, Consumer
Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445 (1968).
One frequently cited case involved a woman who bought a car battery on credit for
$29.30. Her unpaid balance at the time of default was $11.75. After all the front end
charges were imposed, she still faced a $128.80 deficiency judgment. The court denied
the claim for deficiency in spite of the U.C.C. which authorized everything the creditor
had done. Imperial Discount Corp. v. Aiken, 38 Misc. 2d 187, 238 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Civ. Ct.
N.Y. 1963).
A comprehensive study by the National Commission on Consumer Finance, com-
pleted in December, 1972, concluded that the deficiency judgment should be prohibited
in cases of default on a second credit sale in which the original price was $1,765 or less,
or on a loan in which the original amount financed was $1,765 or less. The Commission
believed that implementation of that recommendation would afford consumer protection
in areas particularly susceptible to abuse because it would exempt most household goods
purchased from deficiency judgment and put an end to deficiency judgment abuses
found in some used car markets. NCCF CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 45, at 30-31;
Krahmer, supra note 45. Professor Clark suggests that an additional reason for abolish-
ing deficiencies altogether is "the difficulty of determining the relevant market and the
added burden to courts in policing deficiency judgments arising out of consumer credit
transactions." Clark, supra note 54, at 334.
63. For empirical studies of deficiencies, see Shuchman, Profit on Default: An
Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20 (1969);
Comment, California's Automobile Deficiency Judgment Problem, 4 U.C.D. L. REv. 91
(1971); Note, I Can Get It for You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem of Automobile
Deficiency Judgments, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (1975). See generally Enstrom, Kill the
Automobile Deficiency Judgment, 56 A.B.A.J. 364 (1970); Shuchman, Condition and
Value of Repossessed Automobiles, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (1979).
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the goods. In a number of cases, combined sales actually result
in a profit rather than a loss." Additionally, studies have shown
that if the creditor had conducted the first resale in the retail
market, the result would be few deficiencies and more surpluses
for the debtor. 6 Following is a discussion of several possible
solutions to the deficiency problems and an assessment of the
extent to which they resolve the problem.6
64. In some cases, the practice actually repeats itself with the creditor repossessing
from the new buyer, obtaining a deficiency judgment, and proceeding with another series
of resales. Each time the creditor sells the collateral for close to retail value it has a
deficiency judgment against a consumer for an outstanding amount. Note, supra note 63,
at 1081-82.
65. For example, the Schuchman study reported that of the cases studied, the
"first" sale averaged 71% of Redbook wholesale price and 51% of Redbook retail price. If
the first sale had been made at Redbook retail, the average price would have yielded
108% of the creditor's net claim. See Shuchman, supra note 63, at 31-32.
66. In addition to the approaches discussed in the text, still other possible
approaches include: prohibiting deficiencies unless there is substantial damage to the
collateral other than wear and tear from normal usage, CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2983.8 (West
1974) (mobile homes); prohibiting deficiencies in transactions involving specified types of
collateral such as motor vehicles, cf. Enstrom, supra note 63; restricting the amount of
deficiencies by requiring a public sale in certain situations, such as when the debtor has
paid more than 60% of the purchase price, see D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 28-3812(e)(3) (West
Supp. 1979); prohibiting deficiencies and allowing the creditor to hold the debtor person-
ally liable for wrongful damage to the collateral, (PROPOSAL OF NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES
PROGRAM, CONSUMER VIEWPOINTS: CnrnQUm oF THE U.C.C. BY CONSUMER RESEARCH FOUN-
DATION, 97-98 (R.A. Elbrecht ed. 1969)); prohibiting deficiencies when the debtor has
performed a certain percentage of his obligations (for example, if debtor had paid 60%
of the amount of his original contract before submitting to repossesion). Homer Kripke
suggests that this last approach would be similar to that underlying certain other provi-
sions of the U.C.C. and Uniform Conditional Sales Act. Payment of that percentage
would indicate the likelihood that the collateral was at least equal in value to the
remaining debt and might indicate a surplus. Kripke, supra note 62, at 445, 476.
In cases where a secured creditor who has not complied with the U.C.C.'s require-
ments for repossession and resale of collateral seeks to recover a deficiency, courts have
taken three approaches. Some courts take the position that a secured creditor who fails
to comply is absolutely barred from recovering a deficiency. See, e.g., Atlas Thrift Co. v.
Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, 104 Cal. Rptr. 314 (Ct. App. 1972). These courts balance the
creditor's rights to a deficiency under U.C.C. § 9-504 against the debtor's rights against a
creditor who disregards the Code's requirements under U.C.C. § 9-507. These courts take
the position that the consumer protection policies outweigh the creditor's contractual
rights to a deficiency. To encourage creditors to observe the Code's requirements, the
sanction of a prohibition against a deficiency is designed to force creditors to be more
cautious.
Other courts balance the creditor's rights under U.C.C. § 9-504 against the con-
sumer's rights under U.C.C. § 9-508, but fall short of creating an absolute bar on defi-
ciencies. These courts take the position that when a creditor'fails to comply with the
Code's requirements there is a presumption that the debtor's collateral was worth at
least the amount of the debt, thereby shifting to the creditor the burden of proving the
amount that should have been obtained through a proper resale. See, e.g., United States
v. White House Plastics, 501 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1974).
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The most comprehensive solution to the problem of defi-
ciency judgments, which New Mexico67 and California's have
adopted, is the total abolition of deficiencies in consumer trans-
actions. They did so in an effort to protect consumers from abu-
sive practices of creditors who repossess without judicial
intervention. 9
The "bar all deficiencies" approach to the problem, how-
ever, goes beyond the goal of consumer protection. Not all credi-
tors abuse the U.C.C. scheme of creditors' rights. Specifically,
not all creditors abuse the repossession and resale mechanism.
Nevertheless, many good faith creditors are legitimately owed
money after they sell repossessed goods. The absolute bar on
deficiencies would not permit such a creditor to recover the ben-
efit of its bargain. 0
A second approach is presented in the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (U3C). 71 One of the purposes of the U3C is to pro-
Finally, a growing majority of courts hold that a debtor must prove damages under
U.C.C. § 9-507 to offset a creditor's deficiency claim under U.C.C. § 9-504. See, e.g.,
Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nuss, 6 Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (Ct. App. 1972),
Leasco Computer Inc. v. Sheridan Indus. Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 897, 371 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ.
Ct. N.Y. 1975). Courts that take this position explain that to deprive a secured party of
its rights to a deficiency would be unnecessarily punitive. Thus, they are at the other end
of the spectrum from courts that take the first position.
Unfortunately, most of the cases addressing the issue of the consequences which
attach to a secured party's failure to follow the Article 9 repossession and resale rules do
not articulate their policy judgments with regard to deficiencies. The majority of the
literature on point similarly explains what different courts do, but not why. See 2 G.
GILMORE, supra note 27, at § 44.9.4; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 1127-35.
See, e.g., Buckley, The Future of Self Help Repossession Under the U.C.C., 81 COM. L.J.
165 (1976); Comment, Effect of Creditor Misbehavior on Right to Deficiency Judgment
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Mo. L. REV. 162 (1980).
67. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(2) (1980) provides: "If the security interest secures
an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, and,
unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any deficiency where the collateral
involved is consumer goods."
68. The Unruh Act governing retail installment sales provides: "If the proceeds of
the sale are not sufficient to cover items (1), (2), and (3) of Section 1812.4, the holder
may not recover the deficiency from the buyer or from anyone who has succeeded to the
obligations of the buyer." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.5 (West 1975).
69. See James Talcott, Inc. v. Gee, 266 Cal. App. 2d 384, 387, 72 Cal. Rptr. 168, 170
(Ct. App. 1968) (in discussing whether the anti-deficiency provisions of the Unruh Act
applied to credit sales to businesses for commercial purposes, the court states: "There is
no question but that the Unruh Act was designed to protect the consumer from abusive
credit practices.").
70. See Kripke, supra note 62.
71. The UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE [hereinafter cited as U3C] was promul-
gated in 1968 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. All
references are to the Official Text version, with comments. As of March, 1980 the follow-
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tect consumers against unfair practices by some creditors.7" At
the same time, however, the'U3C strikes a balance between con-
sumer interests and creditors' rights. The U3C prohibits a
secured creditor from recovering a deficiency against a consumer
when the goods involved cost less than $1750.7s The U3C
approach to deficiencies is less effective than the "bar all defi-
ciencies" approach described previously. Although it does take
into account the rights of creditors, by limiting its reach to
transactions involving goods with a cash price of less than $1750,
it fails to adequately protect a large number of consumers. For
example, some of the most flagrant abuses occur in the automo-
bile industry, where the cash price of goods sold often exceeds
$1750.
A third, and more direct approach, is the proposal by the
Federal Trade Commission (Revised Proposed Trade Regulation
Rule on Credit Practices)7 4 that would require secured parties
ing states had enacted the U3C: COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 5-1-101 to 12-105 (1973 & Supp.
1979); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 28-31-101 to 28-39-103 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-4.5-101
to 24-4.5-6-203 (Burns 1974 & Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 537.1101 to 537.7103
(West Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16a-1-101 to 16a-9-102 (1974 & Supp. 1979); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-A1.101 to -A7.127 (Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101
to -303 (West 1972); S.C. CODE §§ 37-1-101 to 6-610 (1977 & Supp. 1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 70B 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101 to 427.105 (West
Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. §§ 40-14-101 to -702 (1977).
72. U3C § 1.102(2)(d), reprinted in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTEs 835, 836 (1979
ed.)
73. U3C § 5.103(1)-(2), reprinted in SELECTED COMMERCIAL STATUTES 835, 965 (1979
ed.) (the amount in § 5.103 varies from state to state). The original draft of the U3C
applied only to credit sales of goods with cash prices of $1,000 or less. U3C § 5.103
(1968), reprinted in UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (West Master ed. 1978). According to
Boyd the $1,000 limitation was imposed for the purpose of restricting the election provi-
sion to those goods subject to excessive depreciation and those as to which the expenses
of sale are likely to be disproportionate to the amount due. Boyd, The Revised Uniform
Consumer Credit Code as a Replacement for Piecemeal Consumer Legislation: The Ari-
zona Context, 18 ARIz. L. REv. 1, 34 (1977).
It is also noteworthy that the original draft of the U3C protected consumers from
deficiencies only as against sellers of goods. In response to criticism, the drafters changed
the U3C to apply to loans as well as sales.
74. The Federal Trade Commission's Revised Proposed Trade Regulation Rule
would make it an unfair creditor practice for a lender or retail installment seller directly
or indirectly:
(a) To take or receive from a consumer an obligation which: . . . (7) Fails to
contain the following provision in any security agreement in personal property:
In the event that collateral is retaken by the creditor there will be no
liability for any deficiency unless the debtor is credited with the fair
market retail value of the collateral as determined by a sale in an
established, retail market.
FTC Staff Report Appendix A, at 3 (Proposed rule 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(7)).
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who repossess and resell to credit the debtor with the fair mar-
ket retail value of the property, as determined by a resale in an
established retail market, when computing the deficiency. This
approach addresses the current problem of creditors who use an
unfairly low resale price as the basis for their computation of a
deficiency. The staff report states that for low value collateral
where no established retail market exists, the rule would have
the effect of an election of remedies, and there would be no need
to determine fair market value.7 5 For other collateral, reference
to the price obtained in an actual retail sale would reduce cur-
rent creditor abuse resulting from reference to the wholesale
market. Alternatively, fair market retail value would be deter-
mined on the basis of a retail sale by a subsequent owner.76 A
noteworthy feature of the approach is that it requires each
security agreement to include language giving consumers a con-
tractual right to credit of a retail fair market value.
Because the F.T.C. proposed rule does not contemplate an
absolute bar on deficiencies, a creditor who makes a good faith
effort to resell the goods fairly is protected if the property is
worth less than the debt. Such a creditor may subtract from the
debt the fair market value of the goods, and recover the result-
ing deficiency from the debtor.7 7
Still another approach, which the National Commission on
Consumer Finance recommended 78 and the State of Wisconsin
adopted, is to abolish self-help repossession. 79 This approach
requires a prior court judgment that states that the debtor is in
default before the creditor can exercise the right to repossess
and seize the collateral. Two follow up studies in Wisconsin80
75. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 307-08.
76. Id. at 323. For a discussion of the original proposed rule, see Comment, Default-
ing Debtors and the Judicial Process - The FTC's Proposed Restriction on Deficiency
Judgments: § 444.2(a)(7) of the Rule on Credit Practices, 8 CONN. L. REv. 457 (1976).
77. For criticism of the revised proposed trade regulation, see FTC STAFF REPORT,
supra note 13. See also Division of Consumer Protection, Bureau of Economics Com-
ments on Credit Practices Rule (Sept. 18, 1980).
78. NCCF CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 45.
79. Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.101-428.106 (West 1973). For a
general discussion of the Wisconsin statute, see Crandall, The Wisconsin Consumer Act:
Wisconsin Consumer Credit Laws Before and After, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 334; Davis, Legis-
lative Restriction of Creditor Powers and Remedies: A Case Study of the Negotiation
and Drafting of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 72 MICH. L. REV. 3 (1973); Heiser, Wis-
consin Consumer Act-A Critical Analysis, 57 M~aQ. L. REv. 389 (1974).
80. Whitford & Laufer, The Impact of Denying Self-Help Repossession of
Automobiles: A Case Study of the Wisconsin Consumer Act, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 607.
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suggest that the legislation has been successful, despite criticism
which predicted that increased creditor costs would be passed on
to the consumer, thus ultimately resulting in restriction of
credit. The Wisconsin statute has resulted in a great increase in
the number of workouts,81 with no apparent rise in the cost of
credit. Over the long term, the data indicates that the incidence
of repossession has declined since the legislature enacted the
Wisconsin Consumer Act. Only a modest reduction of credit
availability has occurred.
Although the Wisconsin "judicialization of repossession"
approach has its critics, experience suggests that it is an equita-
ble solution to the deficiency problem. The increased controls
over creditors have greatly reduced many abusive creditor prac-
tices. Consumers can be liable for deficiencies when creditors
pursue defaulting debtors, but the court supervision should
assure a fair resale and fair deficiency, if any. Finally, in prac-
tice, it appears that creditors and debtors alike are benefiting
from the increase in the number of workouts, which also helps
avoid a variety of the costs commonly associated with
repossessions.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has presented an overview of the consumer defi-
ciency problem in Washington and, in addition, has analyzed
numerous solutions to the problem proposed by national studies
and adopted by other states and ways to protect consumers from
abusive creditor practices. The U3C model does not appear to be
desirable for Washington to follow because most creditor abuse
of deficiencies takes place in industries where the cost of goods
involved exceeds $1750, the U3C limitation. Even if the F.T.C.
Regulation is promulgated, action by the Washington legislature
will be necessary to eliminate the arbitrary distinction the
Washington statute draws between seller and non-seller/ secured
parties.
As part of its efforts to revise the U.C.C., the Washington
legislature should undertake an empirical study of deficiencies in
Washington to ascertain whether or not the problems outlined
in this article exist in the consumer credit industry in Washing-
ton. If abuses exist in only one industry, for example, the auto-
81. A "workout" is an informal out of court settlement of a debt between creditor
and debtor.
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mobile industry, legislation could be proposed to affect only that
industry. If, however, as most commentators suggest, the prob-
lem is widespread, Wisconsin's approach appears to offer the
most equitable solution to the deficiency problem. After the leg-
islature resolves the deficiency problem, it should delete the
additional language in Washington's section 9-501 so it will con-
form to the uniform text.*
* Editor's Note: On November 13, 1980, the Washington Supreme Court decided
Tacoma Telco Federal Credit Union v. Edwards, 94 Wash. 2d 666, 619 P.2d 363 (1980),
see note 13 supra, and held that WASH. Rav. CODE § 62A.9-501(1) (1979) does not apply
to a non-seller/secured party. Thus a third party lender may recover a deficiency judg-
ment after the debtor's default, repossession, and resale pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE §
62.A.9-504 (1979). The court expressly noted, however, that it was not deciding whether
a bank that purchased a seller's contract is prohibited from seeking or obtaining a
deficiency.
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